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Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Virtue of Nature
To impose upon becoming the character of being
—that is the supreme will to power. (WP 567)[1]

Nietzsche’s view of nature and his attack on the platonic tradition has given
him a reputation as a nihilist, a label he himself acknowledged. Yet what
does Nietzsche mean by nihilism? and to what extent is he a nihilist? This
article explores Nietzsche’s use of the term as it relates to modernity, his
own postmodern project, and how it is connected with what Nietzsche calls
“virtue.”

The problem of nature
Nietzsche has been called a nihilist for his rejection of universal standards
for justice and virtue. Generally speaking, interpretations of Nietzsche and
his view of nature vary according to whether his break with metaphysics is
seen as complete, and whether his break is considered desirable. Heidegger,
Nietzsche’s

most

important

interpreter,

emphasizes

Nietzsche’s

understanding of nature as an ordering principle. Modernity, according to
Heidegger, is nothing more than the sustained and growing ignorance of
Being. Since Plato, Heidegger argues, each generation of philosophers has
become less and less able to comprehend the question of Being, much less
speak to its nature. Hence Nietzsche was correct to attack Plato and the
tradition of metaphysics he inspired. “As the fulfillment of modern
metaphysics,” writes Heidegger, “Nietzsche’s metaphysics is at the same

time the fulfillment of Western metaphysics in general and is thus — in a
correctly understood sense — the end of metaphysics as such.”[2] Heidegger
presents Nietzsche as the final nail in the coffin of modernity’s vulgar and
tyrannical

metaphysics.

Heidegger

takes

issue,

however,

with

Nietzsche’s

overzealousness.

Heidegger claims that Nietzsche was so bent on the destruction of
metaphysics
Heidegger,
[3]

Aristotle.

that

his

Nietzsche’s

philosophy

adopted

metaphysics

too

a

metaphysical

closely

resemble

pose.
those

For
of

Heidegger considers the highest element of Nietzsche’s thought,

the eternal return, not the first breath of postmodernity, but the “final
thought of Western metaphysics.”[4] Heidegger argues that the eternal
return is either non-philosophic mysticism or a philosophy borrowed from
Heraclitus.[5] In either event, Nietzsche failed in his attempted break with
metaphysics, and was merely another in the long line of philosophers who
misunderstood

the

importance

of

Being.

Rorty follows Heidegger in celebrating the end of Western metaphysics. For
Rorty, postmodernism is, at its root, the rejection of an objective view of
nature. The belief in absolute value, Rorty claims, originates in Greek
philosophy and continues on into the Enlightenment and includes even
Heidegger.[6] The “realists,” as Rorty refers to them, wish to ground the
“solidarity” of political communities in Nature and Truth. As this assumes
that their perceptions somehow correspond to reality, realists are required to
construct a metaphysical support for their beliefs. It is far better, Rorty
asserts, for the values of a community to be founded on its own conception
of good, rather than on a belief in Nature, or as he would say it, for
objectivity

to

be

replaced

by

the

demands

of

solidarity.

In Rorty’s formulation, reliance on opinion supplants the need for Truth. The
difference between knowledge and opinion is not a quality but quantity:
wisdom and Truth are replaced by opinion and consensus.[7] Rorty invokes
fellow pragmatist William James, who defines truth as “what is good for us
to believe.”[8] In comparison, a realist “presupposes that knowledge, man,
and nature have real essences which are relevant to the problem at hand.”[9]
In effect, Rorty replaces Nature and Truth with a series of dynamic sociohistorical agreements, making philosophy in the platonic sense neither

possible

nor

desirable.

Rorty, like many others, sees Nietzsche as the first to assess accurately the
nature of truth, and he emphasizes the part of Nietzsche’s thought that
portrays nature as an unknowable chaos. Rorty quotes Nietzsche’s claim that
truth is “a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms—
in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed,
and embellished poetically and rhetorically and which after long use seem
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which
one has forgotten that this is what they are” (TL).[10] For Rorty, Nietzsche
summarizes perfectly the major precept of postmodernism. So dependent on
Nietzsche is Rorty that if Nietzsche did not exist, Rorty would have to invent
him.
These accounts of Nietzsche only agitate those concerned with the effects of
Nietzsche’s philosophy. Many blame Nietzsche for the nihilistic sensibilities of
the present age. Stanley Rosen presents such a case. Rosen disagrees with
Heidegger on Nietzsche’s failure and with Rorty on Nietzsche’s value as a
philosopher. Rosen believes that Nietzsche succeeded in his break with
Western metaphysics, a feat that should be anything but celebrated. “In my
opinion,” writes Rosen, “Nietzsche has no ultimate teaching of a theoretical,
constructive nature. The riddle to Nietzsche’s consistency cannot be
unlocked because it does not exist.”[11] For Rosen, Nietzsche’s teaching has
the same outcome for which Nietzsche blames Platonism and Christianity: “it
empties human existence of intrinsic value.”[12] Nietzsche’s teaching is not
only contradictory; it is disquieting and dangerous. Rosen believes that even
Nietzsche’s Yes-saying magnum opus, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “implodes
into

chaos.”[13]

Rosen’s analysis derives in part from his recognition of the problem of nature
in Nietzsche’s writing. “The term nature thus plays an ambiguous role in
Nietzsche’s thinking,” writes Rosen.[14] “Nietzsche advocates a return to the
natural order in a sense, but not in a Platonic or Aristotelian sense.” For
Nietzsche, “nature is power and, still more fundamentally, chaos.”[15] Rosen,
unlike Heidegger, does not see Nietzsche as having an affinity with Aristotle
and dismisses such nonsense. For Rosen, the result of the two views of
nature in Nietzsche’s works is nihilism. Yes, nature is the standard for

values, but if nature is chaos, as it is in Nietzsche, then all values are
relative

to

man’s

will

to

power.

Leo Strauss is another key Nietzsche interpreter. In an often-neglected piece
entitled “Relativism,” Strauss writes of Nietzsche’s “revaluation of all
values”:
Nietzsche may be said to have transformed the deadly truth of relativism
into the most life-giving truth... We limit ourselves here to saying that the
movement of Nietzsche’s thought can be understood as a movement from
the supremacy of history towards the supremacy of nature, a movement
that bypasses the supremacy of reason throughout or tries to replace the
opposition between the subjective and the objective (or between the
conventional and the natural) by the opposition between the superficial and
the profound. Existentialism is the attempt to free Nietzsche’s alleged
overcoming of relativism from the consequences of his relapse into
metaphysics

or

of

his

recourse

to

nature.[16]

Strauss is not dissembling when he warns that he is “[stating] the case with
all necessary vagueness.”[17] Strauss is unable to be more specific, he
claims, because he is unsure about Nietzsche’s final judgment concerning
the will to power. Strauss ponders Nietzsche’s “hesitation as to whether the
doctrine of the will to power is [a] subjective project to be superseded by
other such projects in the future or whether it is the final truth.”[18] However
much

Strauss’s

interpretation

is

wanting,

his

ambivalence

illustrates

perfectly the difficulty in coming to terms with Nietzsche and the role that
nature

plays

in

his

teaching.

These views also mirror the seemingly contradictory manner in which nature
is presented in Nietzsche’s thought. On one hand, Nietzsche states that his
goal is “to translate man back into nature” (BGE 230).[19] He argues that
man has drifted too far from his natural self, sacrificing his instincts and
power for the comfort and convenience of modern society. Nietzsche writes:
“I use the word ‘vice’ in my fight against every kind of antinature or, if you
prefer pretty words, idealism” (EH Books 5; emphasis added).[20] In this
formulation, Nietzsche recommends a form of naturalism or metaphysics
that seeks to ground science, morality, and politics in the innocence and
integrity

of

nature.

Yet nature also appears in Nietzsche’s writings as chaotic. Nature is
described as “wasteful beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure,
without purposes and consideration, without mercy and justice, fertile and
desolate and uncertain at the same time; imagine indifference itself as a
power” (BGE 9).[21] Nietzsche warns—“Let us beware”—against deifying
nature. “The total character of the world...is in all eternity chaos,” Nietzsche
teaches. “In the sense not of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order,
arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other names there are
for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms” (GS 109).[22] Nietzsche denies that
there are any “laws in nature”; rather, “there are only necessities.”
Nietzsche breaks with those, including Plato, who view nature as the source
of

divinity

and

order

in

the

universe

and

denies

any

teleological

understanding of nature or man. And if there is no true end, there can be no
“accidents”

either.

These somewhat paradoxical statements raise many questions. First, how
can nature’s chaos ground political and moral life? If nature is indifferent, or
even hostile, to man, how can it serve as a source of order and stability?
Moreover, if nature is as adverse and unpleasant as Nietzsche claims it is,
why should we be willing to accept it as a guide? This view demands that
nature be overcome, not heralded. Also, why is it so difficult to live
according to nature and instinct? Put differently, how was man ever able to
break with nature in the manner that Nietzsche details?

Nihilism and being
Before concerning ourselves with the question of whether Nietzsche’s view of
nature makes him a nihilist, we should first establish what is meant by the
term nihilism. One interpreter usefully defines etymologically, as a “denial or
negation, of the established and esteemed beliefs and values in morality and
religion.”[23]

Certainly

this

definition

would

include

Nietzsche.

But this is not Nietzsche’s sense of the term. Nihilism is used most often by
Nietzsche when referring to the consequences of modernity and its reliance
on reason.[24] On this he writes: “Faith in the categories of reason is the

cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to
categories that refer to a purely fictitious world” (WP 12b). This explains,
Nietzsche notes, how it is that the greatest values have come to devalue
themselves. In this respect, Nietzsche’s philosophy is nihilistic insofar as
nihilism

is

the

Yet

all

non-metaphysical

not

starting

point

for

his

philosophies

philosophy.[25]

positive
are

nihilistic.[26]

Consider

Alexander Bain, for whom belief is “that upon which a man is prepared to
act.”[27] Similarly, William James notes, “beliefs...are really rules for
action.”[28] Here, nihilism is not so much an –ism, as the inability of belief to
supply a basis for action. Hence the problem is not that “everything is
permitted,” as Ivan Karamazov says,[29] but that nothing is done. This is the
nihilism at odds with life, the nihilism that Nietzsche envisions spreading
across nineteenth century Europe (WP Pr. 2), and the nihilism that his
philosophy

aims

to

counter.

The nihilism that Nietzsche fears is tied to inaction. “Life itself,” he writes, “is
to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of
forces, for power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. It is my
contention that all the supreme values of mankind lack this will—that the
values which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are lording it
under the holiest names” (A 6).[30] Nietzsche deplores this nihilism—“the
sign of a despairing, morally weary soul” (BGE 10). Elsewhere, Nietzsche
writes that suicide is “the deed of nihilism” (WP 247), and he recognizes
“pessimism as a preliminary form of nihilism” (WP 9; Cf. 37, 38). In the
Genealogy, Nietzsche describes nihilism as nothing more than nausea mixed
with pity (GM 3.14; Cf. A 7).[31] If nihilism is a sort of inaction, then
Nietzsche’s philosophy points away from nihilism, not to it. The will to power
is

nothing

if

not

a

doctrine

of

action.[32]

For Nietzsche, a turn from nihilism requires not only that values serve life,
but also that we actually believe them. Nietzsche writes: “That a great deal
of belief must be present; that judgments may be ventured; that doubt
concerning all essential values is lacking—that is the precondition of every
living thing and its life. Therefore, what is needed is something that must be
held to be true—not that something is true” (WP 507). Faith and belief are
more

valuable

and

indeed

more

crucial

to

life

than

is

truth.

The good or bad of nihilism is assessed according to its ability to inspire
action.

Consequently,

Nietzsche

speaks

of

many

different

forms

of

nihilism.[33] Of the many he names, four are the most important, and they
appear in two pairs. Nihilism has four dimensions, depending on whether it
is practical or theoretical (WP 4), active or passive (WP 22). Nietzsche places
himself alongside the philosophers of the future in the theoretical-active
category.

Active

Passive

Theoretical Nietzsche, Philosophers Heidegger,
of

the

Future,

Free Foucault

Spirits, Free Minds, the Rorty,
Romans, pre-Socratics, Derrida,
Buddhists

Machiavelli
Practical

Socialists,

liberals, Christians
[34]

conservatives

; Jews,

Muslims

The categories are inclusive in that, in a sense, it is impossible not to be a
nihilist, because nihilism, in Nietzsche’s view, is an existential condition. As
one interpreter notes, “nihilism is tied to being.”[35] The only way, Nietzsche
argues, to avoid being a nihilist is to see life as more than the will to power,
a notion he deems undesirable and impossible. “There is nothing to life that
has value, except the degree of power — assuming that life itself is the will
to power (WP 55). Yet if it is impossible to avoid thinking nihilism, it is
essential that we avoid living nihilism.[36] Nihilism is tied to being as it
articulates Nietzsche’s appreciation for the problem of nature. Once the
Greek problem, before Socrates at least, this is the problem that Nietzsche
seeks

to

resurrect

in

his

philosophy

of

the

future.

For Nietzsche, nihilism is “ambiguous” (WP 22; emphasis removed).[37]
Nietzsche sees “nihilism as a normal phenomenon [that] can be a symptom
of increasing strength or of increasing weakness” (WP 585B). Nihilism can
lead to strength as easily as it can lead to despair (WP 23). This was the

reason that Nietzsche could speak with little difficulty of himself as a nihilist
(WP 25). He was unaffected by the passive and practical nihilism that was
spreading over Europe because he saw past it. Nietzsche writes: “He that
speaks here...has done nothing so far but reflect: a philosopher and solitary
by instinct, who has found his advantage is standing aside and outside, in
patience, in procrastination, in staying behind;...as the first perfect nihilist of
Europe who, however, has even now lived through the whole of nihilism, to
the

end,

leaving

it

behind,

outside

himself”

(WP

Pr.

3).

That Nietzsche could look past the nihilism made him wish to advance it all
the more. Nietzsche saw value in nihilism. Nietzsche calls his revaluation of
values “a movement that in some future will take the place of this perfect
nihilism—but presupposes it, logically and psychologically, and certainly can
come only after and out of it” (WP Pr. 4). Nietzsche’s philosophy does not so
much celebrate nihilism, as it recognizes the overcoming of nihilism as the
only

true

foundation

upon

which

culture

can

thrive

(UD

3).[38]

Heidegger and Rorty miss the niceties of Nietzsche’s philosophy. To them,
Nietzsche would most likely respond: “there may actually be puritanical
fanatics of conscience who prefer even a certain nothing to an uncertain
something to lie down on—and die. But this is nihilism and the sign of a
despairing, mortally weary soul—however courageous the gestures of such a
virtue may look” (BGE 10). In Nietzsche’s view, there is no essential
difference between Plato’s “pure spirit and the good as such” and Rorty’s
relativism, as both are bent on the tyranny of “denying perspective” (BGE
Pr.). Both have anointed their opinion as truth and remain unwilling to
consider rival truth-claims. Rorty’s teaching is merely the culmination of
Plato’s teaching: a decayed modernism. Much to Rorty’s chagrin, Nietzsche
would argue that there is a clear line from Plato to Rorty: both are nihilists,
hostile to life. Rorty did not follow Nietzsche in his break from Platonic
political

philosophy;

rather,

Rorty

continued

modernity

in

spite

of

Nietzsche.[39] In this sense, Nietzsche would not consider Rorty the herald of
the postmodern, but the continuation of the exhausted modern project.
The difference between Nietzsche and Rorty is clearest concerning what each
calls truth. While Nietzsche opposes the influence of democracy on
philosophy, Rorty uses democracy, or a belief in the equality of individuals

and consensus, as the standard for his “truth.” For Nietzsche, consensus is
no standard by which to judge truth. Nietzsche, we should recall, was the
first to proclaim the death of god as a fact of history, and he opposes
Christianity and democracy despite their ability to achieve and maintain
consensus. Truth—or what he more often calls “reality”—exists for Nietzsche
independently of opinion, shared or otherwise. That most philosophers have
agreed on any number of issues by no means increases the likelihood that
they are correct; rather, it is more likely that their views are either partially
mistaken or entirely false. The more perspectives that exist, the greater the
chance that one is useful or true. Diversity, not consensus, and perspective
through

experience

are

prerequisites

for

a

claim

to

truth.

That others have misunderstood Nietzsche’s point is also evident in what
Rorty says of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. He writes that each
tried, in his early years, to find a new way of making philosophy
‘foundational’....Each of the three, in his later work, broke free of the
Kantian conception of philosophy as foundation, and spent his time warning
us against those very temptations to which he himself had once succumbed.
Thus their later work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying rather
than systematic, designed to make the reader question his own motives for
philosophizing

rather

than

to

supply

him

with

a

new

philosophical

[40]

program.

Viewing philosophy as therapeutic rather than creative or active is what
Nietzsche means by theoretical and passive nihilism. Nothing is believed, so
nothing is done. The best we can do is to comfort each other as we dangle
over

the

abyss.

Nietzsche may think modernity to its conclusion, but his perspectivism is not
nihilism.[41] Nietzsche is not a nihilist in the conventional sense in that he
does not consider all values to be of equal worth.[42] For Nietzsche, in fact,
absolute relativism and absolute truth are virtually indistinguishable in their
hostility to life.[43] Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return is an attempt to
avoid both extremes: it is not metaphysical, or “otherworldly,” because it is
not absolute. It is nevertheless superior to other perspectives because it
derives from a profound appreciation of nature and man’s will to power.
Nietzsche presents the will to power as the fundamental fact of nature, and

the eternal return, the embrace of eternal becoming, as the highest
attainable goal. While Nietzsche recognizes the theoretical nihilism, or chaos,
in which we exist, he advocates a philosophy that willfully transcends it.

All too beautiful
The other, more serious charge, against Nietzsche is that his philosophy is
disquieting, dangerous, and just plain ugly. Consider Allan Bloom, who
writes:
Nietzsche wanted to destroy all scientific and metaphysical doctrines that
would turn us away from a free examination of what we are and from taking
ourselves seriously. He wanted to know the knower in order to evaluate
what is said to be knowledge, and that is the most difficult of all
philosophical undertakings. His is a model of the gifts and the dedication
necessary for seeing what goes on within and developing adequate
hypotheses about what it all means. He came to the conclusion that man is
will to power, which is not, in the centrality of aspiration that it underlines,
entirely without kinship with Eros. But Nietzsche could not call it Eros
because he could not bring himself to believe that there is anything naturally
beautiful.[44]
Bloom acknowledges Nietzsche’s importance as a philosopher, yet takes
issue with his doctrine of the will insofar as it does not admit, or at least that
Nietzsche himself could not admit, that anything is “naturally beautiful.”
There is much in Nietzsche’s works to support this view. Nietzsche thought,
for example, that beauty was relative to matters of growth and preservation.
In this respect, the strong and the weak both conceptualize the beautiful in
different terms. The strong will know beauty in vastly different ways. Some
may, for example, view the Christian as beautiful, while others may see
beauty in Nietzsche’s will to power or the eternal return. In this formulation,
“the beautiful exists just as little as does the good, or the true” (WP 804).
Bloom misses the point, however; for Nietzsche, nothing was more beautiful
than natural man, and the will to power is a doctrine that reflects this belief.

“The

world

is

overfull

of

beautiful

things,”

Nietzsche

writes,

“but

nevertheless poor, very poor when it comes to beautiful moments and
unveilings of these things. But perhaps this is the most powerful magic of
life: it is covered by a veil interwoven with gold, a veil of beautiful
possibilities, sparkling with promise, resistance, bashfulness, mockery, pity,
and seduction. Yes, life is a woman” (GS 339). If nothing is naturally
beautiful, it is only because man has lost his capacity for recognizing it. The
world as will to power is beautiful because is serves what is most beautiful in
man (AOM 342, GS 336).[45] The most we can say is that the will to power
makes the naturally beautiful ugly as much as Plato’s eide makes the
naturally

ugly

beautiful.

Others claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is dangerous or potentially
disruptive. For Rosen, Nietzsche’s teaching is
an appeal to the highest, most gifted human individuals to create a radically
new society of artist-warriors[,]...expressed with rhetorical power and a
unique mixture of frankness and ambiguity in such a way as to allow the
mediocre, the foolish, and the mad to regard themselves as the divine
prototypes of the highest men of the future. A radically new society requires
as its presupposition the destruction of an existing society; Nietzsche
succeeded in enlisting countless thousands in the ironical task or selfdestruction,

all

in

the

name

of

a

future

utopia.[46]

Rosen does not mince words: Nietzsche is not on par with Plato as a
philosopher; he appears alongside Marx as the philosophers most hostile to
Western values. Rosen writes: “There cannot be the slightest doubt that, on
Nietzschean grounds, theology, metaphysics, and ontology are all utter
nonsense. Unfortunately, the same can be said of science and scientific
philosophy, because these lead to the negation of sense and of the
significance

of

human

existence.

The

only

consolation

is

art.”[47]

In Herzog, Saul Bellow puts it this way: “Dear Herr Nietzsche...Humankind
lives mainly upon perverted ideas. Perverted, your ideas are no better than
those of the Christianity you condemn. Any philosopher who wants to keep
his contact with mankind should pervert his own system in advance to see
how

it

will

really

look

a

few

decades

after

adoption.”[48]

Although Nietzsche did not have the luxury of responding to Rosen and

Bellow directly, he might have done so by referring to the passage from Ecce
Homo where he writes: “Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things,
including books, than he already knows. For what one lacks access to from
experience one will have no ear” (EH Books 1). In other words, Nietzsche’s
books are mirrors for the soul. Interpreting Nietzsche as ugly or dangerous
says more about ourselves and our view of the world than it does about his
philosophy.
Furthermore, Nietzsche was well aware that his philosophy could be
misused. “A book full of spirit communicates some of it to its opponents
too,” he writes (AOM 160). Later in the same piece, he argues: “It says
nothing against the ripeness of a spirit that it has a few worms” (AOM 353).
Nietzsche understood the power of words, and did not hesitate to effect
great

change

through

his

books.

A better defense would include Nietzsche’s acknowledgement that his project
requires a long period of time; he does not envision an overnight revolution
or violence on a world-scale. “If a change is to be as profound as it can be,”
Nietzsche writes, “the means to it must be given in the smallest doses but
unremittingly over long periods of time! Can what is great be created at a
single stroke?” (D 534).[49] If there is violence or destruction, it is more
likely done to founders and creators whose strength and capacity for selfless
deeds

is

great

(TI

Skirmishes

44).[50]

Nietzsche saw his philosophy as a service to man. As a great destructive
force, Nietzsche also embodies great potential (EH Destiny 2). “It is
incontestable,” he writes, “that the spirit of humanity is almost in greater
danger during the approach of such eras than it is when they and the chaotic
turmoil they bring with them have actually arrived: the anxiety of waiting
and the greedy exploitation of every minute brings forth all the cowardice
and the self-seeking states of the soul, while the actual emergency, and
especially a great universal emergency, usually improves men and makes
them more warm-hearted” (SE 4).[51] If Nietzsche’s philosophy is dangerous,
it is only because he is cognizant of the greater danger he is trying to avert.
Like Rorty, Nietzsche has real problems with how knowledge is esteemed in
the modern world. Unlike Rorty, Nietzsche wishes to restore the possibility of
philosophy, and uses the will to power as a starting point. As Nietzsche

writes: “of what concern to us is the existence of the state, the promotion of
universities, when what matters above all is the existence of philosophy on
earth! [Or]—to leave absolutely no doubt as to what I think—[it] is so
unspeakably more vital that a philosopher should appear on earth than that
a state or a university should continue to exist” (SE 8). Nietzsche’s primary
task is the recovery of philosophy in a grand fashion; conversely, Rorty
claims that such an act is neither possible nor desirable.[52] While Rorty and
many postmodernists celebrate the end of philosophy, Nietzsche heralds its
restoration as his primary goal. He wishes to change what is called
philosophy, to uncover the moralism that has suffocated it for centuries, and
to

return

it

to

its

rightful

place

in

the

service

of

humanity.

Nietzsche’s opposition to Plato and the tradition he inspired is not so much a
negation of truth as an affirmation of perspective as an element of
philosophy. Nietzsche’s new philosophy is not tyrannical: it does not value
truth as its highest aim, nor does it perceive its subjective claims on truth as
objective and absolute. It does not, and indeed cannot, create the world in
its own image, for it does not claim such an act even to be possible, much
less desirable. Nietzsche’s perspectivism incorporates experiences past and
future. It is not the end or the limit of philosophic or scientific activity as
much as it acts as a starting-point; his perspectivism is a floor, not a ceiling.
In

this

sense,

philosophy

is

perspective.

Leo Strauss once wrote of Nietzsche: “It is certainly not an overstatement to
say that no one has ever spoken so greatly and so nobly of what a
philosopher is as Nietzsche.”[53] It is also not an overstatement to say that
greater praise could not come from the pen of Strauss. However much
Strauss is ambiguous on the nature of Nietzsche’s philosophy, he is firm in
his praise of Nietzsche’s view of philosophy.

Nietzsche’s virtues
Nietzsche’s

break

with

modern

morality

and

modern

standards

for

philosophy means that we must look elsewhere to determine how he should
be evaluated. We need not look far for such a standard, for Nietzsche

himself presents one: Nietzsche too has his virtues. Of course Nietzsche’s
virtues are neither Christian nor Aristotelian; Nietzsche’s virtues are those of
a

philosopher,

a

philosopher

of

the

future.

Nietzsche lists four key virtues of a new philosopher: solitude, insight,
courage, and sympathy.[54] The first, solitude, is the most explicit in
Nietzsche. Solitude is a virtue because it is the means by which camel
spirits, those individuals most burdened by the decadence of modern
society, can save themselves. It is in solitude where camel spirits become
lion spirits, destroyers of values. And it is through this metamorphosis that
the natural creative impulses are revealed. Solitude is contrasted with
society, the mass who value what is low in man, those who have no
ambition, no goal, and indeed no god, whether they know it or not. Solitude
is a virtue because it saves man from great vice. It is an opportunity for man
to know nature, to know himself, and to allow himself to become an agent of
nature.

In

solitude

the

will

dialogues

with

nature.

The second virtue, insight, accords with the next step in fashioning a
philosophy of the future. The destruction made possible by solitude results
from appreciating perspective through experience and a newfound sense of
will. Christianity and democracy are vices insofar as they hinder the ability to
know nature and man’s true self. As a virtue, insight replaces the rigid
dogmatism of science and moral philosophy. Insight is a product of
experience

and

an

appreciation

of

perspective.

Perhaps the most important virtue for Nietzsche is the one most lacking in
modern society: courage (D 551). Courage is most simply understood as
strength. As Nietzsche writes, “the first thing a philosopher needs: inflexible
and rugged manliness” (SE 7). Courage is the mark of a strong will, one
willing to risk oneself (EH Pr. 3, Wise 5, ‘Wagner’ 4), often to the point of
compromising one’s own happiness (SE 4, TI Pr.). Courage, the virtue most
similar to the will itself, is present at all three metamorphoses detailed by
Zarathustra, and it is required by each. In this sense, without courage,
philosophy is not possible. “Even the most courageous among us rarely has
the courage for that which he really knows,” Nietzsche claims (TI Maxims
and Arrows 2). Nor does philosophic courage simply mean courage on the
page (WP 841). Insight, and with it action, both require courage.

The final virtue, sympathy, is the one least likely to be associated with
Nietzsche. Of his virtues, it certainly appears the least often. This is the
consequence, it would seem, of sympathy already being the most common
virtue in modern society. Modern morality is nothing if not an exercise in
sympathy. Nietzsche’s sympathy is not altruism or simply being a good
neighbor; it is something far more substantial. The eternal return is an act of
sympathy in that it demands that we will the past, present, and future in
their entirety, warts and all. The eternal return is not possible under
conditions of pity, ressentiment, or pessimism, for these are the symptoms
of

the

weak

and

the

world-weary.

For all of Nietzsche’s talk of responsibility, however, it is not right to say that
the philosophers of the future will be duty-bound to “ordinary human
beings”; rather, “one has duties only to one’s peers” (BGE 260). Nietzsche’s
philosophers serve their equals, those of rank who understand the conditions
necessary for the spiritual advance of a people.[55] For Nietzsche’s new
philosophers, duty is the culmination of a philosopher’s virtue and the
greatest source of joy (D 339, SE 5). Sympathy is the highest of Nietzsche’s
virtues in that it incorporates the others. Nietzsche’s sympathy is a profound
achievement, where the will to power meets a genuine love of humanity. It
is

an

act

of

“Roman

Caesar

with

Christ’s

soul.”

Nietzsche’s virtues are not his own; they are by no means self-serving. He
determined them based on what was most needed for modern society, what
could save and restore a corrupted society. He writes: “A man’s virtues are
called good depending on their probable consequences not for him but for us
and society: the praise of virtues has always been far from ‘selfless,’ far
from ‘unegoistic’....When you have a virtue, a real, whole virtue...you are its
victim” (GS 21). Christianity and modern morality erred in thinking that
virtue had anything to do with characteristics other than strength and the
qualities needed to found and support a healthy culture (TI Skirmishes 37,
WP 255). Nietzsche’s virtues, those of a self-proclaimed immoralist, are
those of a philosopher concerned with the future of man. It is these virtues
that he exhibits in his books and fosters in his readers.

Conclusion
Will to power is the “essence” of life because it is “the fundamental instinct”
of nature. In this sense, it can neither be free nor unfree. The choice
available to man is not whether to will, but what to will. Nietzsche’s depiction
of solitude makes clear, however, that value-creation is not a wholly internal
or arbitrary process, and Nietzsche’s philosophers are compelled to justify
their beliefs according to what they advance in man. The will to power may
be the heart of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but it is not the whole of it.
Nietzsche’s new philosophy is that perspective best able to use the natural
order of rank to guide art, science, religion, and politics for the sake of man
and

culture.

Although Nietzsche views the eternal return as the highest that is attainable,
it also reveals the moral and intellectual limits of man. Just as he resists
universal morality, Nietzsche presents a philosophic imperative to resist
universal truth.[56] Recognizing the limits of the will and of what we can
know is the only means of appreciating the new philosophy and founding a
healthy politics. The eternal return is an acceptance of man’s limitations: it is
the highest expression of man’s will consistent with nature and the order of
rank. Nietzsche transcends the nihilism of modernity and deploys the eternal
return to bring a modicum of morality and order into what he views as an
otherwise chaotic world. Nietzsche diminishes what man cannot know in
favor of what man can become. The eternal return was Nietzsche’s definitive
statement on the value of life: he loved life more than anything else, and
above all else, more than its meaning.[57] We may well expect that
Nietzsche’s last thoughts were: “Thus I willed it,” or “Once more..!” Like his
Zarathustra,

Nietzsche

danced

with

Eternity.

Nietzsche is the first postmodern in that he was the first to comprehend the
consequences of modernity, what he called Plato’s “higher swindle” (TI
Ancients 2). Insofar as his successors have failed to grasp his message,
Nietzsche may be the only postmodern. His meditations may still be
“untimely.” What has come to be known as postmodernism, Nietzsche would
contend, is merely the fulfillment of the modern project—another straw on

the camel’s back. Heidegger and Rorty do not follow Nietzsche’s break, but
continue modernity in spite of him. Rorty’s decadence, Nietzsche would
argue, is evident in his preference for the rule of diversity and opinion over a
respect for nature and the order of rank. Heidegger’s ignorance stems from
his inability to think through the consequences of his philosophy, and more
specifically, an inability to differentiate between freedom and fascism. For
Heidegger, Nazism was just another politics. Nietzsche points away from
these men. Nietzsche’s works are an attempt to inspire greatness, redirect
philosophy,

and

revitalize

Western

culture.

Unlike most of his successors, Nietzsche did not destroy the possibility of
philosophy; rather, he sought to reinvigorate it in what he considered to be
a superior form. Nietzsche changed both the aims and limits of philosophy,
making it less concerned with the love of truth and more concerned with a
love of mankind. A Nietzschean philosopher must not mistake wisdom for life
or choose a dance with the former over an eternity with the latter. A
Nietzschean philosopher loves truth, but it is a truth that is life-preserving
and,

ultimately,

life-affirming.

At

once

Nietzsche

makes

philosophy

dangerous to and responsible for the political. In sum, Nietzsche takes
philosophy

seriously.

Nietzsche claims that the modern project erred insofar as it sought to
overcome the problem of nature. What is now called postmodernity has
erred insofar as it has ignored altogether the problem of nature. Nietzsche
argues it was appreciating nature as something noble yet unsolvable that
drove Greek culture to its heights, and makes the Greeks so worthy of
imitation. For Nietzsche, the distance between physis and nous is to be
bridged by what he calls philosophy. If nature is the problem for man, then a
philosophy in the service of life is the best possible answer and the only
likely solution.

[1]

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann and R. J.

Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY: Vintage, 1968). I use the following
abbreviations for Nietzsche’s works: A=The Antichrist, AOM=Assorted
Maxims and Opinions, BGE=Beyond Good and Evil, BT=The Birth of Tragedy,

D=Daybreak, EH=Ecce Homo, GM=On the Genealogy of Morals, GS=The
Gay Science, SE=Schopenhauer as Educator, TI=Twilight of the Idols,
TL=Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, UD=Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life, WP=The Will to Power. References are to section; EH and TI
include

chapter

titles.

I agree with R. J. Hollingdale on the content and the use of Nietzsche’s
Nachlass; he writes, “the Nachlass can be read with profit only by someone
familiar with Nietzsche’s published works, the reason being...that its content
is rejected material. In itself it is an enormous and confusing jumble of
notes, aphorisms and brief essays, some in a recognizably Nietzschean
style—although lacking the finish and the ‘speaking’ quality of the published
writings—but many no more than memoranda, jotting, or lists of themes. To
attempt to absorb this mass of unorganized material without some guiding
principle is a lost labour, and the only principle which does not impose a
spurious order upon it is that of comparison and collation with the published
work.”
[2]

Nietzsche,

Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 4: Nihilism, Frank A. Capuzzi, trans.

(New
[3]

223.

York,

NY:

Harper

&

Row,

1979),

138.

Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche: ‘God is dead,’” The Question

Concerning Technology and Other Essays, William Lovitt, trans. (New York,
NY:
[4]

Harper

Row,

1977),

94.

Martin Heidegger, “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra,” The New Nietzsche,

David
[5]

&

B.

Allison,

Nietzsche

ed.

himself

(Cambridge,

suspects

the

MA:

MIT

Press,

latter:

“The

doctrine

1977),
of

78.

‘eternal

recurrence,’ that is, of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular
course of all things—this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been
taught already by Heraclitus. At least the Stoa has traces of it, and the
Stoics inherited almost all of their principal notions from Heraclitus” (EH
‘Birth’
[6]

3).

Rorty indicts even Heidegger and Jacques Derrida, claiming that they

“deify” language, “letting ‘Language’ substitute for ‘God’ or ‘mind’—
something mysterious, incapable of being described in the same terms in
which we describe tables, trees, and atoms.” Essays on Heidegger and
others, Philosophical papers, vol. 2 (New York, NY: Cambridge University

Press,
[7]
[8]

1991),3-4.
Cf.

Plato,

The

Republic,

477a-478d

and

533d-534c.

Richard Rorty, “Solidarity or objectivity?” Objectivity, relativism, and

truth, philosophical papers, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press,
[9]
[10]

1991),

22.

Rorty, “Solidarity or objectivity?” Objectivity, relativism, and truth, 24.
Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense,” The

Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Penguin Books,
1982), 42-47. Note: Rorty’s use of this quote does not include the sentence
past the colon and incorrectly reads “anthromorphism.” See his “Solidarity or
objectivity?”
[11]

Objectivity,

relativism,

and

truth,

32.

Stanley Rosen, The Ancients and the Moderns: Rethinking Modernity

(New

Haven,

[12]

CT:

Yale

University

Rosen,

[13]

Press,

1989),

Ancients,

Rosen,

226.
198.

Ancients,

201-02.

[14]

Rosen,

Ancients,

195.

[15]

Rosen,

Ancients,

198.

[16]

Leo Strauss, “Relativism,” Relativism and the Study of Man, Helmut

Schoeck and James W. Wiggins, eds. (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Co.,
1961),

153-54;

emphasis

added.

[17]

Strauss,

“Relativism,”

153.

[18]

Strauss,

“Relativism,”

153.

[19]

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufmann, trans.

(New
[20]

York,

NY:

Vintage

1966).

Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY:

Vintage,
[21]

Books,

1989).

This tension is found in The Birth of Tragedy, too. After attacking

Friedrich Schiller and his take on the Greek chorus as against “all naturalism
in art,” Nietzsche confesses: “I fear, however, that we, on the other hand,
with our present adoration of the natural and the real, have reached the
opposite pole of all idealism” (BT 7). Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of
Tragedy, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Random House, 1967).
[22]

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New

York,

NY:

Vintage

Books,
[23]

Nimrod Aloni, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche’s Healing and Edifying

Philosophy
[24]

1974).

(Lanham,

MD:

University

Press

of

America,

1991),

60.

This brand of nihilism is best described by Maurice Blanchot; he writes:

nihilism “is not an individual experience or a philosophical doctrine, nor is it
a fatal light cast over human nature, eternally vowed to nothingness.
Rather, Nihilism is an event achieved in history, and yet it is like a shedding
off of history, a molting period, when history changes its direction and is
indicted by a negative trait: that values no longer have values themselves.
There is also a positive trait: for the first time, the horizon is infinitely
opened to knowledge.” “The Limits of Experience: Nihilism,” The New
Nietzsche,
[25]

Allison,

ed.,

122.

“Nihilism is not the doctrine which he seeks to defend...but rather the

problem with which his philosophy begins.” Robert C. Solomon, From
Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists and Their NineteenthCentury Backgrounds (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1970), 112.
Elsewhere, Solomon argues: “Nihilism is not a thesis; it is a reaction. It is
not a romantic ‘Nay-saying’ so much as it is a feature of good old
enlightenment criticism in the form of a critical phenomenology or a
dialectical hermeneutics.” “A More Severe Morality: Nietzsche’s Affirmative
Ethics,” Nietzsche: Critical Assessments, Vol. III, Daniel W. Conway, ed.
(New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 325. Solomon goes on to compare
Nietzsche with Kant and Aristotle. According to Solomon, all three were
engaged in the same “intellectual exercise, that is, to present and promote a
theory of morality.” Interpreters who contrast Aristotle and Nietzsche, such
as Alasdair MacIntyre, Solomon continues, “[close] off to us the basis upon
which we could best reconceive morality: a reconsideration of Aristotle
through Nietzschean eyes” (331). Cf. MacIntyre’s After Virtue: A Study in
Moral Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,
1984).
[26]

Jean-François

Lyotard,

for

example,

defines

the

postmodern

as

“incredulity to metanarratives,” and goes on to ask: “Where, after the

metanarratives, can legitimacy reside?” The Postmodern Condition: A Report
on Knowledge, Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, trans. (Minneapolis,
MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), xxiv-xxv. For Jürgen Habermas,
“incredulity toward metanarratives” is only a desirable path if we “preserve
at least one standard for [the] explanation of the corruption of all reasonable
standards” in order to escape a “totalizing self-referential critique.” “The
Entwinement

of

Myth

Enlightenment,”
[27]
[28]

and

New

Alexander

Enlightenment:

German

Bain,

The

Re-dreading

Critique

Emotions

26

and

Dialectic

(1982):

the

Will

of
28.

(1859).

William James, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,”

Pragmatism, The Works of William James, Frederick H. Burkhardt, ed.
(Cambridge,
[29]

MA:

Harvard

University

Press,

1975-88),

259.

Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, Richard Pevear and Larissa

Volokhonsky,

trans.

(New

York,

NY:

Vintage

Books,

1991),

69.

Rosen also uses the former definition of nihilism as Nietzsche’s definition.
Nihilism: A Philosophical Essay (South Bend, IN: St. Augstine’s Press, 2000),
xiii. It occurs in WP 602: “‘Everything is false! Everything is permitted!’” Yet
Nietzsche’s use of quotation marks makes it unclear as to which perspective
he
[30]

is

R.
[32]

adopting

Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Antichrist,” The Portable Nietzsche, Walter

Kaufmann,
[31]

actually

trans.

(New

York,

NY:

Penguin

Books,

1982),

565-658.

Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Walter Kaufmann and
J.

Hollingdale,

trans.

(New

York,

NY:

Vintage,

1989).

Nihilism “is the problem to which the Will to Power is the answer.” Robert

C. Solomon, “Nietzsche, Nihilism, and Morality,” Nietzsche: A Collection of
Critical Essays, Robert C. Solomon, ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame

Press,

1980),

203.

Cf. Gillespie who thinks that the will to power is the root cause of nihilism.
“Previously, nihilism was understood as the consequence of the hubristic
magnification of man. In Nietzsche’s view, it is the consequence of the
democratic diminution of man. On the basis of this new understanding,
Nietzsche argues that the solution to nihilism is a turn to the superhuman,
that is, a turn to exactly that notion that previously was conceived to be the
essence of nihilism” (xx). Gillespie concludes, “nihilism arises in the context

of a new revelation of the world as the product not of reason but of
will....The solution to nihilism thus lies not in the assertion of the will but in a
step back from willing” (xxiii). Gillespie cleverly argues that Nietzsche’s
misunderstanding of the term nihilism results in a misrepresentation of his
own thought. Gillespie overlooks, or willfully ignores, that Nietzsche often
co-opts words for his own use. Hence Gillespie’s case against Nietzsche
becomes a matter of semantics. Nihilism Before Nietzsche (Chicago, IL:
University
[33]

of

Chicago

Press,

1995).

As White lists them: “‘Active’ and ‘passive’ are paired, as are ‘theoretical’

and ‘practical’ nihilism, and ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete’ nihilism. Other forms
appear in relative isolation, including ‘authentic’ nihilism, ‘contagious’
nihilism, ‘ecstatic’ nihilism, the ‘most extreme’ nihilism, ‘first’ nihilism, ‘final’
nihilism, ‘fundamental’ nihilism, ‘genuine’ nihilism, ‘philosophical’ nihilism,
‘radical’ nihilism, ‘religious’ nihilism, ‘tired, nihilism, and ‘suicidal’ nihilism.
Commentators have further complicated matters: Heidegger has added
‘classical nihilism’ as though it were a Nietzschean term, Deleuze ‘reactive’
nihilism, and Rosen the opposition, to which he refers as ‘Nietzsche’s
fundamental distinction,’ between ‘base’ and ‘noble.’” Alan White, Within
Nietzsche’s
[34]

Labyrinth

(New

NY:

Routledge,

1990),

15-16.

To the extent that conservatives are beholden to a particular religion,

they

move

into

the

[35]
[36]

York,

passive-practical

quadrant

alongside

Blanchot,

Christians.
126.

“Philosophical nihilism is the doctrine which is founded on the initial

premise of the complete absence of absolute values and standards—either
theological or rational in origin—to which man can appeal in the matter of
beliefs
[37]

and

values.”

Aloni,

73.

Others interpret this to mean that nihilism is impossible. Blanchot writes:

“Nihilism is the impossibility of coming to an end and finding an outcome in
this end....Nihilism here tells us its final and rather grim truth: it tells of the
impossibility of nihilism.” He concludes that “Nihilism would be identical with
the
[38]

will

to

overcome

absolutely”

(126).

Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the uses and disadvantages of history for life,”

Untimely Meditations, R. J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University

Press,

1997).

[39]

Stanley Rosen presents a searching take on Rorty’s philosophy and his

“cartoons.” Ancients, 175-188.
[40]

Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ:

Princeton

University

Press,

1979),
[41]

5-6.

For an example of the nihilistic interpretation of Nietzsche, see Jürgen

Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Frederick Lawrence,
trans.
[42]

(Cambridge,

MA:

MIT

Press,

1987).

Alexander Nehemas makes this distinction, and rightly so. “Nietzsche,

modernity, aestheticism,” Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, 223-251.
[43]

Compare Hegel’s metaphysics with Nietzsche’s, for example. See,

Frederick C. Beiser, “Introduction: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics,”
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Frederick C. Beiser, ed. (New York, NY:
Cambridge
[44]

University

Press,

1993),

Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster,

1993),
[45]

1-24.
544-55.

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Assorted Opinions and Maxims,” The Portable

Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1968),
64-67.
[46]

Rosen,

[47]
[48]
[49]

Ancients,

Rosen,
Saul

Bellow,

Herzog

Ancients,
(New

York,

NY:

190.
198-99.

Penguin,

1996),

319.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, R.

J. Hollingdale, trans. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
[50]

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” The Portable Nietzsche,

Walter Kaufmann, trans. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1982), 463-563.
Nietzsche argues that cause and effect should be used “only as pure
concepts, that is to say, as conventional fictions for the purpose of
designation and communication—not for explanation. In the ‘in-itself’ there
is nothing of ‘causal connections,’ of ‘necessity,’ or of ‘psychological nonfreedom’; there the effect does not follow the cause, there is no rule of ‘law.’
It is we alone who have decided cause, sequence, for-each-other, relativity,
constraint, number, law, freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we
project and mix this symbol world into things as if it existed ‘in itself,’ we act

once

more

as

we

have

always

acted—mythologically”

(BGE

21).

Cf. William James, who writes, “the word ‘cause’ is...an altar to an unknown
god.” “The Principles of Psychology,” The Works of William James, vol. 2,
1264.
[51]

Friedrich Nietzsche, “Schopenhauer as educator,” Untimely Meditations,

R.
[52]

J.

Hollingdale,

trans.

(New

York,

NY:

Cambridge,

1997).

“Whatever happens, however, there is no danger of philosophy’s ‘coming

to an end.’ Religion did not come to an end in the Enlightenment, nor
painting in Impressionism....There will be something called ‘philosophy’ on
the other side of the transition.....The only point on which I would insist is
that philosophers’ moral concern should be with continuing the conversation
of the West, rather than with insisting upon a place for the traditional
problems of modern philosophy within that conversation.” Rorty, Philosophy
and
[53]

the

Mirror

of

Nature,

5-6.

Leo Strauss, “An Introduction into Heideggarian Existentialism,” The

Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism: An Introduction to the Thought of
Leo Strauss, Thomas Pangle, ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
1989),
[54]

40.

Nietzsche originally lists them in the following order: courage, insight,

sympathy, and solitude (BGE 284). The order of my treatment seems more
aligned

with

their

role

in

fashioning

a

new

philosophy.

Redlichkeit certainly holds a high place for Nietzsche; he writes, “Nothing is
rarer among moralists and saints than honesty” (TI Skirmishes 41).
Elsewhere, Nietzsche includes honesty [Redlichkeit] among them (BGE 227
and D 556), but I would argue, honesty is a combination of insight and
courage. For a longer treatment of honesty as a virtue, see Alan White, “The
Youngest Virtue,” Nietzsche’s Postmoralism: Essays on Nietzsche’s Prelude
to Philosophy’s Future, Richard Schacht, ed. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University

Press,

2001),

63-78.

Robert C. Solomon suggests the following list of “distinctively ‘Nietzschean’
virtues: exhuberance, ‘style,’ ‘depth,’ dynamism, venturesomeness, fatalism
(amor fati), playfulness, aestheticism, solitude.” “Nietzsche’s Virtues,”
Nietzsche’s Postmoralism, 141. Solomon concludes that, unlike those like
Aristotle, whose virtues are of a social nature, Nietzsche’s virtues are “better

understood in an extremely individual context” (143). In one of his other
books, co-authored with Kathleen M. Higgins, Solomon expands the list of
virtues to include “courage, courtesy, egoism, ‘the feminine,’ friendship,
generosity, hardness, health, honesty, integrity, justice, ‘presence,’ pride,
responsibility, strength, temperance.” What Nietzsche Really Said (New
York,
[55]

NY:

Schocken

Books,

2000),

183.

“We would agree with Gillian Rose that Nietzsche unlike Foucault did not

attempt to separate politics from knowledge; his aim was not retreatism but
to secure personal independence without ressentiment and to develop a new
politics.” Georg Stauth and Bryan S. Turner A Commentary on Nietzsche’s
Ecce Homo (Lanham, MA: University Press of America, 1994), 23. Cf. Gillian
Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, post-structuralism and law (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell,
[56]

1984),

183.

Randall Havas notes that “rather than claiming that we should take

responsibility for the meaning that we impose on the world, Nietzsche means
to show us how—in a philosophic mood—we resist the meaning that we find
in the world.” Nietzsche’s Genealogy: Nihilism and the Will to Knowledge
(Ithaca,
[57]

NY:

Dostoevsky, 231.

Cornell

University

Press,

1995),

17.

